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INDONESIA IN 2006
 
Cautious Reform
 
Damien Kingsbury
Abstract
 
Indonesia in 2006 appeared to be stabilizing after several years of political and
economic upheaval. Cautious reforms continued, but official corruption re-
mained problematic. It appeared that the Aceh conflict was over. At year’s end,
Indonesia still faced many daunting problems but appeared to be charting a
steadier course.
Keywords: Indonesia, reform, military, Aceh, economy
 
Following the economic upheavals of the late 1990s and
the uncertainty and chaos of the first years of the 21st century, 2006 proved to
be a year in which Indonesia appeared to be regaining a sense of stability. The
country continued to be beset by problems, reflecting its physical and cultural
dispersion, compromised economy, and continuing high levels of corruption.
But 2006 was remarkable in that there were few shocks or major negative events.
Most importantly, those events over which political leaders had some volition
moved along, if at a sometimes slow pace. If the presidency of Susilo Bam-
bang Yudhoyono was occasionally criticized for being too slow in continuing
to implement reform, it was also because he was cautious in its implementa-
tion. Given the large body of interests vested in the status quo, cautious reform
appeared to be a wise, if sometimes frustrating, approach to guiding the state.
 
Politics
 
Indonesia’s political processes continued to evolve in 2006 in line with a series
of mild reformist changes that had been undertaken since the resignation of
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President Suharto in 1998. The most successful political move in 2006 was the
further cementing of the peace agreement in Aceh, with passage of the Undang-
Undang Pemerintahan Aceh (Law on the Governing of Aceh, LoGA) through
the legislature (DPR) in July. Despite a number of problems with the LoGA raised
by Acehnese, in particular representatives of the Free Aceh Movement, peace
continued there, marred only by a few generally minor incidents. The first round
of Aceh’s administrative elections occurred on December 8, and despite attract-
ing a wide range of candidates from official parties as well as individual candi-
dates, was convincingly won by pro-GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh
Movement) independent candidates Irwandi Jusuf and Muhamad Nazar. This
precluded the planned second round of voting.
On the issue of the passage of the LoGA, which occurred later than stipu-
lated under the peace agreement, there remained an extended backlog of legis-
lation in the DPR, much of it held up because of inefficiencies and political
infighting within the legislature’s committee system, which reviews legislation
before passage. In particular a controversial revision of the labor law proposed
by President Yudhoyono, which critics said allowed too much deregulation of the
labor market, was held up in the DPR. With one eye firmly fixed on potential
voters, the major parties in the legislature, Golkar and the main non-government
aligned Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle, PDI-P), refused to pass the law.
As Indonesian political society comes to grips with an open electoral envi-
ronment, there has been increased public focus on voter intentions through the
use of polling; this has influenced how campaigns are conducted.
 
1
 
 There was
also increased focus on the links between Islam and democracy, and Islamism
and terrorism.
The Cabinet came in for some criticism for its performance in 2006, with
some ministers keeping their posts despite being seen as underperforming.
 
2
 
Some observers believed President Yudhoyono was exercising too much per-
sonal control on Cabinet decision making. Voters also appeared disenchanted
with the president, by May downgrading his personal approval rating to 34%,
a drop of one-half compared with September 2004 when he was elected. This
disappointment stemmed largely from cuts to fuel subsidies against a backdrop
of oil imports at record high prices.
 
3
 
Rule of Law
 
The issue of the rule of law continued to plague Indonesia in terms of inter-
national perceptions, but especially for Indonesian citizens who sought justice.
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Indonesia’s judicial system has been widely held to be the most corrupt institu-
tion in the country; its reform was high on the agenda of President Yudhoyono.
The case of the murder of human rights activist Munir Said bin Thalib by
poisoning in September 2004 also continued to plague the legal system. Munir’s
convicted murderer, Pollycarpus Priyanto, had his 14-year sentence dismissed by
the Supreme Court on the grounds that no one actually saw him poison Munir.
 
4
 
Priyanto continued to serve a two-year sentence for falsifying documents. In-
donesia’s National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Indonesia, BIN) was
widely held to have been involved in Munir’s death and refused to assist in the
investigation or trial. As a 
 
Jakarta Post 
 
editorial noted,
 
Pollycarpus’s escape from the premeditated murder charges reminds us of the high-
profile trials of Army officers and civilian leaders accused of involvement in crimes
against humanity in East Timor in 1999 and Tanjung Priok in 1984. Those trials ran
on an identical script. Some of the defendants were found guilty in the lower court,
to the cheers of human rights activists. But it was the defendants who had the last
laugh, as they finally were acquitted in the appeal court due to a “lack of evidence.”
Their exoneration was only a matter of time.
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U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston was refused in-
volvement in investigating the case on the grounds, according to police chief Gen-
eral Sutanto, that “it would undermine Indonesia’s law enforcement process.”
 
6
 
Another controversial judicial process was the execution in September 2006
of three Catholics convicted of inciting religious conflict between the large Chris-
tian population and increasing population of Muslims in central Sulawesi in
2000 and 2001. More than 1,000 people were killed in these sectarian clashes.
Seen by many as unbalanced because no Muslims had been sentenced to death
for their part in the conflict, the executions led to local rioting.
Some observers viewed the executions as paving the way for the execution
of three of the 2002 Bali bombers, Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, and Imam Samudra,
who were identified with the radical Islamist terrorist organization Jema’ah
Islamiyah (literally, Islamic Community). Jema’ah Islamiyah has continued to
exist but is believed to have split into two factions, the smaller of which appeared
intent on continuing its bombing campaign.
The Indonesian judicial system’s capacity to release influential prisoners early
has long been of concern, and so it was when Hutomo Putra Mandala, better
known as Tommy Suharto, youngest son of former President Suharto, was
released from jail on October 30, just five years into a 15-year sentence. This
had been reduced to 10 years without explanation. Hutomo Putra Mandala was
 
4. “Supreme Court Quashes Conviction in Murder of Indonesia Rights Activist: Report,”
Associated Press, Jakarta, October 4, 2006.
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6. “Police Wary of UN Rappporteur in Munir Probe,” ibid., November 1, 2006.
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originally sentenced for the murder of a Supreme Court judge who had earlier
convicted him of graft. Concern that his early release implied interference with
the judiciary was expressed by members of the Indonesian legislature, while the
 
Koran Tempo
 
 newspaper also noted that it appeared that money could reduce
prison sentences.
 
7
The Economy
 
The Indonesian economy continued to grow during 2006 at just over 5%, con-
tinuing to stay below the population growth rate of just over 6%. The gap
between economic and population growth had been a feature of the Indonesia
economy since 1998, primarily as a consequence of low levels of foreign invest-
ment. Two of Indonesia’s largest foreign-export income earners, oil and natural
gas, also remained at low levels. Oil was being imported rather than exported
because of a lack of investment in the industry and a decrepit infrastructure,
both of which limited production. Tourism was also declining amid enduring
security concerns.
Poverty in Indonesia increased to 18% in 2006, up four million to almost 40
million people. The poverty rate was set at $16.80 per month, well below even
the minimal benchmark of a dollar a day, which would otherwise have put
some 80 million Indonesians below the poverty line.
 
8
 
 More positively, the
rupiah improved to around 9,200 to the U.S. dollar, while Indonesia continued
to reduce its external debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio, bringing it
down to 40%, from 80% in 2000.
 
9
 
 Notably, Indonesia completed repayment of
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) undertaken through the Ex-
tended Fund Facility, which had bailed the country out of the 1997–98 finan-
cial crisis.
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 Official interest rates were also decreased during the year, to 10.75%.
Inflation was projected to average around 8% in 2006 and decline to 6%–7%
in 2007. Non-performing loans, which had plagued the economy following the
financial crisis, eased to 5% (net, 8.8% gross).
 
11
 
In a positive sign for foreign investment, the petrochemical giant BP signed
a $2.6 billion deal to finance the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Tang-
guh, West Irian Jaya. The project was expected to generate exports accounting
for some 6% of total global demand and worth around $2 billion a year, with
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contracts let to 2035. This was set against the wider negative foreign investment
climate, especially in oil and LNG extraction.
 
The Military
 
Reform of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military, TNI)
had been one of President Yudhoyono’s top priorities after being elected. He
confirmed this goal with the appointment of army moderate (and former mili-
tary academy classmate) Djoko Suyanto as commander in chief in January 2006
and reiterated it in a speech to TNI officers in September. But despite the rhet-
oric, in practice, military reform slowed during the year. Although under Indo-
nesian law TNI members should be tried in civilian courts for non-military
related crimes, in September Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono rejected civil
jurisdiction. Juwono claimed that it could compromise military interests and
hinder the defense system, an argument quickly rejected by political analysts
and the human rights organization Imparsial.
Meanwhile, two arms scandals occurred involving TNI personnel. In Octo-
ber, four Indonesians and two foreigners were arrested in the U.S. for conspir-
ing illegally to ship military equipment and arms worth $900,000 to Sri Lanka’s
Tamil Tiger guerrillas. The six were extradited to Indonesia. An earlier minis-
terial decree blocked TNI members from buying their own weapons, in an
attempt to limit corrupt sales and gun-running.
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Political Fragmentation
 
Having approached the verge of fragmentation after Suharto’s resignation in
1998 and with the loss of East Timor in 1999, Indonesia in 2006 continued to
consolidate. The Aceh peace settlement passed its first anniversary with few
major problems, and the first round of local administrative elections there was
scheduled for December. In the newly created province of West Irian Jaya, in
West Papua, local elections went ahead with little disruption, although many
people in the area voiced dissent over the creation of the new province. Mean-
while, West Papuan political and cultural groups continued to coalesce under
the umbrella of the West Papua Coalition for National Liberation, with a view
to presenting a united front to the Indonesian government in 2007 in order to
renegotiate West Papua’s relationship with Jakarta. Elsewhere religious tensions
were abated in Maluku although Central Sulawesi saw some sporadic violence.
Other claims to separatism remained muted or nonexistent.
Decentralization moved forward, although primary investment still focused
on cities rather than 
 
kabupaten
 
 (regencies, or sub-provincial districts). A key
 
12. “Accused on Guam Agrees to Face Charges in Maryland,” Associated Press (Hagatna,
Guam), October 3, 2006.
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problem of decentralization—lack of regional administrative experience—
continued to be experienced throughout 2006. This was compounded by a rel-
atively high level of localized official corruption, especially in the granting of
licenses.
 
13
 
 Religious tensions also simmered, especially in an attack in July against
the unconventional Islamic organization Ahmadiyah (Followers of Ahmad), while
communal tensions intensified, if unevenly, across the archipelago.
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Corruption
 
Under Yudhoyono’s direction, Indonesia more actively pursued its major prob-
lem of institutionalized corruption. A number of cases were brought to trial by
government agencies during the year, although these appeared to be primarily
symbolic and did little to address the extent of corruption. Indonesia continued
to have a poor Transparency International (TI) corruption rating, 137 on a scale
of 158.
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Less connected to corruption and more to institutional inefficiency, the Cen-
tral Java earthquake of late May devastated wide areas around the ancient cap-
ital of Yogyakarta, but central government responses were slow. Over 6,000
people were killed in the earthquake; more than 500,000 fled their homes, cre-
ating serious internal refugee problems.
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 Despite the extensive damage, the
Indonesian government claimed it could handle this crisis without external as-
sistance. If aid to Central Java was slow, it was unsurprising then that the Aceh
and Nias Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency, which had the much greater
task of rebuilding the largely devastated province, was also criticized for being
slow and inefficient.
 
International Relations
 
Indonesia’s international relations during 2006 continued to chart a mixed course.
The country’s nearest neighbors were again angered over unregulated dry-season
forest fires, which cast a thick pall of smoke across the region. Meanwhile, re-
lations with Australia soured in the early part of the year following the arrival
in Australia of 43 asylum seekers from West Papua. Indonesian authorities de-
manded that they be sent back, but Australia’s Department of Immigration ac-
cepted 42 of them as legitimate refugees. In a bid to defuse Jakarta’s anger,
Australian Prime Minister John Howard offered to tighten immigration laws
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to thwart further asylum seekers, but this gesture backfired when enabling leg-
islation for it was rejected by the Senate.
On November 13, Canberra and Jakarta signed a new treaty ensuring closer
cooperation across a range of areas, including closer military links, coopera-
tion against terrorism, joint patrolling of the maritime boundary, and taking a
harder line against West Papuan activists. Australia also agreed to help Indo-
nesia build a nuclear power plant, which followed the scrapping of a similar
idea in the mid-1990s because of the archipelago’s geological instability.
Further abroad, Indonesia was outspoken in its opposition to Israel’s con-
flict with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with Hamas in the West Bank. This cre-
ated a small amount of tension with the United States, which had otherwise
grown closer to Indonesia through the reestablishment of military-to-military
links. A flying visit by U.S. President George Bush in November chose to steer
away from difficult political or military issues, underscoring the mutual desire
for a problem-free, if also somewhat content-free, bilateral relationship.
 
Conclusion
 
As Indonesia approached 2007, it looked more stable and confident than it had
since the mid-1990s, although the country remained beset by problems includ-
ing the state’s unclear sense of unity and purpose. Many of the problems still
looked insurmountable, mostly because of the nearly impossible archipelagic
geography and its implications for state organization. Yet, for a sprawling, de-
veloping country of some 230 million, Indonesia in 2006 was more stable than
many; if some of its issues remained deeply embedded in its structure, it also
appeared that other problems showed a chance of being overcome. This was
perhaps the country’s most promising outlook in a decade.
